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Abstract
 
This article evaluates the contributions which Richard Florida's seminal ‘creative class’
thesis might make to ongoing efforts to re-inscribe ‘culture’ back into political economy
explanations of the rise of Tiger economies. It reflects upon the value of reconsidering
both the role of skilled migrants in Tiger states and the factors which attract skilled
migrants to these economies in the first instance. Based upon analyses of a series of
focus groups conducted with Scottish expatriates currently working in Dublin, the article
specifically attempts to gauge how far the creative class thesis can be stretched to
account for the locational preferences of talented migrants. Whilst Florida's work
undoubtedly sheds light on aspects of expatriate existence which might not otherwise
have been obvious, its ability to account for the relationships which have existed between
technology, talent and tolerance in the Celtic Tiger must be questioned. Moreover, if
political economy and Floridian readings are to do more than simply inform one
another, there will be a need to establish more clearly the complex ways in which
developmental states intersect with skill flows and cosmopolitan cultural agendas.
 
Culture in the rise of Tiger economies
 
In searching for economies which merit the noun ‘Tiger’, most commentators begin
with the Pacific Asian region and with good cause. This region has been witness to three
waves of world class economic growth, with Japan pioneering the first wave, the four
‘dragon economies’ of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore taking up the
mantle in the second, and finally, the three South East Asian ‘cubs’ of Malaysia, Thailand
and Indonesia rising to announce the third wave (Pang, 1994). Subsequently, the
economic success enjoyed by Vietnam, Myanmar and China has been taken to constitute
a fourth wave. Beyond Pacific Asia, nevertheless, lie a number of other contenders.
Whilst Brazil, Mexico and India have sought to claim Tigerhood for some time, more
recently countries as diverse as Ireland and Israel, and even Chile, Mauritius and
Botswana have attracted the label (O’Hearn, 2000; O’Riain, 2000; 2004).
As the membership base has expanded, debate has increasingly focused upon the
extent to which it remains possible to speak of a single Tiger model of growth. The
dragon economies of course are taken to be paradigm examples of the virtues of
 
developmental states
 
 and their brand of state technocracy and command capitalism
(Evans, 1995). According to some commentators, however, globalization has sounded
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the death knell for developmental accumulation strategies. The Tigers emerging today
are not being steered by an interventionist state but instead are been lubricated by a
neoliberal agenda which is seeking growth by rolling back regulation and pinning
down footloose transnational capital (O’Hearn, 1998; 2000). Occupying more central
ground, other critics have cautioned against the all too easy rejection of the concept of
the developmental state and have sought to extend the notion by contrasting the
‘bureaucratic developmental states’ of Pacific Asia with a new breed of ‘flexible
developmental state’ or ‘developmental networked state’ (O’Riain, 2000; 2004).
Insofar as they are seeking to account for truly formidable economic growth rates, it
is perhaps unsurprising that the various explanatory frameworks proposed to date have
drawn upon more muscular political economy perspectives. Accompanying political
economy debates on the various pathways that have led to Tigerhood, nevertheless, and
inspired in part by the cultural turn in the new economic geography, some recent work
has also revealed a refreshing interest in the role of ‘culture’ in the rise of Tiger
economies. In literature on the Pacific Asian Tigers alone, for instance, it is possible to
identify at least four ways in which the concept of culture has been mobilized.
Firstly, new narratives of the nation and new supra-national ‘imagined communities’
have been mobilized to boost national self confidence and legitimate socially divisive
economic development programmes (Wee, 2001; Chang and Lim, 2004; Sparke 
 
et al.
 
,
2004). Secondly, local social networks, technology clusters and knowledge communities
have combined to create an atmosphere of entrepreneurship and innovation and served
as a catalyst for the rise of post-Fordist industrial districts and networked learning regions
(O’Riain, 2000; 2004; Beaverstock, 2002; Low, 2005). Thirdly, ‘culturalization’ of the
economy has enhanced not only the contribution of the formal cultural industries to
national income but also the significance of companies reliant upon creative product design
and trading symbolic goods in market places driven by consumption tastes and lifestyle
dispositions (Chang, 2000a; 2000b). Finally, cosmopolitan and multicultural agendas have
been promoted in order to attract investment and skilled international migrants in key
sectors of the economy (Li 
 
et al.
 
, 1998; Yeoh and Chang, 2001; Yeoh, 2005).
In spite of recent progress, there remains a need to interrogate more systematically
and forcefully the status of culture in the emergence of Tiger economies. In searching
for an explanatory framework which affords culture a more central role in urban and
regional growth, this article turns attention to Richard Florida’s recent ‘creative class’
thesis (Florida, 2002; 2005a; 2005b). According to Florida, the successful cities and
regions in future will be the ones most endowed with the 3Ts: technology, talent and
tolerance. Whilst Florida claims that all three elements are equally important, it is clear
that the originality of his thesis rests upon the priority he ascribes to each relative to
traditional orthodoxy. According to Florida, pools of creative talent are at least as
important as stocks of technology in driving urban and regional development, and the
cultural atmosphere of a place is at least as important as its technological labour markets
in drawing creative talent to cities and regions.
If Florida is to convince political economy frameworks to open up even more to
culture, he needs to be able to provoke a reconsideration of the status of skilled personnel
and skilled migrants in the rise of Tiger economies. Within political economy literature
skilled international migration has been viewed as a response to the uneven insertion of
national economies into the new international division of labour. Skilled migrants have
been channelled into Tiger states from major business centres in Europe, North America
and Japan; initially to establish low-value-added assembly platforms, then to promote a
movement towards high-value-added export-oriented production, and more recently, as
some Tigers have aspired to world city status, to enhance global command and control
capability in corporate headquarters and global producer services companies (Pang,
1994; Findlay 
 
et al.
 
, 1996; 1998; Hui, 1997; Yeoh and Chang, 2001; Beaverstock, 2002;
Low, 2002; 2005; Abella, 2004).
But has this literature inadequately diagnosed the location of mobile talent in the
causal sequence? According to Florida, the causal chain ‘tolerance attracts talent which
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stimulates technological innovation and creates growth’ is just as persuasive as political
economy assumptions which hold that ‘technology creates jobs, jobs attract talent, and
talent creates tolerance’. Tiger economies are so successful because they have been
blessed with the cultural qualities necessary to attract members of the creative class and
once in situ this class has driven growth. This argument gives rise to the question: does
skilled labour settle in Tiger states for reasons other than mere economic opportunity,
and are these migrants as much a cause of growth as a consequence?
In a critical review of the ‘cultural turn’ in the new economic geography, Gregson
 
et al.
 
 (2001; see also Shields, 1999; Simonsen, 1999; 2001; Kong, 2000; Pratt, 2004;
Miles and Paddison, 2005), observe the ways in which the concepts of ‘political
economy’ and ‘culture’ have been variously and poorly defined within the urban and
regional studies literature in particular (see also Shields, 1999; Simonsen, 1999; 2001;
Kong, 2000; Pratt, 2004; Miles and Paddison, 2005). This in turn has led cultural
perspectives to be either cannibalized by political economy approaches or to proceed
with only minimal recognition of the power of economic and political forces. As a
consequence Gregson 
 
et al.
 
 (2001) call for oppositional thinking to be resolved at an
ontological level. Capitalism is a cultural as well as political and economic system and
political and economic practices must always be deconstructed and shown to be
historically and geographically provincial.
Whilst acknowledging the power of this critique, this article will present both political
economy and Floridian readings of the role of skilled international migrants in Tiger
economies separately. For the moment, the notion of dialogue will be preferred to
synthesis, integration and/or unification, not least since it is imperative to keep in mind
the different objects of enquiry each perspective foregrounds: skilled international
migrants and the creative class. Whilst occupying similar universes, members of the
creative class clearly constitute only a subset of all skilled international migrants. In
calling for literature on skilled international migration to open up to the insights of the
creative class thesis, it will be necessary to exploit some blurring of the boundaries
between each constituency. But for the moment, the theoretical integrity of each tradition
will be respected.
Given the complex ways in which Tiger states have become integrated into the
global economy, the pertinence of the creative class thesis is likely to vary
significantly between them. In exploring the benefits which the creative class thesis
might bring to explanations of the rise of Tiger economies, this article will present a
case study of skilled migration to one Tiger state in particular, the Republic of Ireland.
The Republic of Ireland represents the most profitable meeting point for both bodies
of scholarship as it has been explicitly claimed by each as a paradigm example. For
Sean O’Riain (2000; 2004), for instance, Ireland stands as a classic Tiger economy not
only because of its rapid economic growth in the past decade but more importantly
because growth was commanded by a developmental state that shares the same family
roots as many of the Tiger economies of Pacific Asia. Meanwhile, alongside Austin
Texas, Florida cites the Celtic Tiger and in particular Dublin as a showcase example of
a city-region which is already proof positive of the validity of his entire thesis
(Florida, 2002: 300–2).
This article is structured around two sections. In the first section, the utility of
bringing a Floridian perspective to bear on the case of the Celtic Tiger is further
elaborated. Following a relatively straightforward political economy reading of skilled
international migration to the Celtic Tiger, Florida’s ideas will then be introduced and
their significance for flows of talent to Ireland explained. Section 2 of the article will
then report upon the findings of ten focus groups which were conducted with skilled
Scottish expatriates working in Dublin in the summer of 2003. Here the objective will
be to assess the extent to which the creative class thesis is capable of explaining the
relocation decisions of Scottish workers; in other words, whether there is any evidence
that skilled Scots are moving to Dublin in response to the city’s ability to service their
basic cultural needs.
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Florida’s creative class thesis and the role 
of cosmopolitanism in the rise of the Celtic Tiger
 
A political economy reading of skilled international migration to the Celtic Tiger
 
Already one of Europe’s poorest nations, the Irish Republic suffered a prolonged
economic depression throughout the 1980s. Remarkably, however, from 1993 onwards,
the country witnessed a spectacular reversal in its fortunes. Between 1991 and 2005,
GDP per capita grew from 79% of the EU-15 average to 125%. Between 1995 and 2002,
in particular, the economy grew by an average of 8% a year, compared with the EU-15
average of 2.5% (Figure 1). In the early 2000s, slower growth rates led pessimists to
question whether the bubble had at last burst (Clinch 
 
et al.
 
, 2002). New forecasts
suggesting a return to impressive if not spectacular growth (
 
c.
 
 5–6%), however, would
appear to have galvanized a renewed enthusiasm and rekindled a belief that the miracle
is still alive (Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, 2005).
There is now a vast literature which seeks to explain Ireland’s economic success
(O’Hearn, 1998; 2000; 2001; Allen, 1999; Taylor, 2000; McSharry and White, 2000;
Ferreira and Vanhoudt, 2004; House and McGrath, 2004; Hardiman, 2005). As the label
‘Tiger’ increasingly came to be associated with the country, so too its growth strategy
has come to be compared with its Pacific Asian counterparts. According to O’Riain
(2000; 2004), this comparison is useful as Irish economic growth was marshalled by a
type of developmental state that derives from the same family of command capitalism
practised in the dragon economies. In place of the highly centralized and interventionist
roles played by state technocrats in Pacific Asia, however, the Irish state has operated
with a more flexible and decentralized command structure and has exercised a much
lighter touch.
On this basis, O’Riain argues that whilst the Pacific Asian economies are
characterized by a 
 
bureaucratic developmental state
 
, Ireland has grown under the
governance of a new type of 
 
flexible developmental state
 
 or 
 
developmental networked
state
 
. For O’Riain, Ireland’s flexible development state has been centrally implicated in
brokering three interacting but empirically distinctive modes of integration into the
global economy:
 
Figure 1
 
Annual GDP growth rates, EU-15 and Ireland (source: Eurostat, 2004)
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The first, and most widely recognised is built around attracting foreign investment and to a
limited degree embedding it into the local economy. The global goes local. The second, and
most surprisingly given Irish economic history, is the emergence of a local network of
indigenous firms that have become increasingly integrated into international business and
technology flows and have been highly successful in international markets. The local goes
global. Third, a series of national neo-corporatist social partnership agreements since 1997
have created a stable macroeconomic and financial environment that has underpinned
industrial transformation, while mediating the relationship of unionised workers and welfare
recipients to the global economy. The national level mediates local adjustment to the global
(O’Riain, 2000: 184).
 
As Ireland’s economy has expanded, so too its labour market has tightened. In 1992,
unemployment stood at 15.4% and compared unfavourably with the EU-15 average of
8.9%. By 2004 unemployment was down to 4.5% compared to the EU-15 average of
8.1% (Figure 2). In the same period the total size of the workforce has grown by over
600,000, from around 1.4 million to over 2 million. Even with relatively high fertility
levels (Figure 3), growing female participation in the workforce, and major investment
in upgrading the technical skills of the population (Wickham and Boucher, 2004), the
labour market has been operating at full capacity. Against this backdrop, it is not
surprising that Ireland has witnessed a remarkable reversal in its long tradition as a major
exporter of people (Figure 3). The Celtic Tiger’s insatiable appetite for labour has
dramatically increased the volume of people now relocating to Ireland and it is
questionable whether the country could have enjoyed economic success without
immigration.
In spite of the rapidity of the growth of the Irish economy and the significant
expansion of immigrant inflows, immigration policy in Ireland remains broadly intact
from the days when it was a major exporter of people (see Immigrant Council of Ireland
2003 for an overview of the regime). Nationals from EU member states (including the
ten accession states who joined in 2004), those from the wider EEA area, and Swiss
nationals can freely work and live in Ireland. High-skilled workers from further afield
can move subject to obtaining ‘work visas’ which are granted to employees in sectors
suffering skill shortages for a period of two years initially with the possibility of renewal.
 
Figure 2
 
Unemployment rates, EU-15 and Ireland (source: Eurostat, 2004)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
Year
U
ne
m
pl
o
ym
e
n
t R
at
e
s
Unemployment Rates - EU-15    
Unemployment Rates - Ireland
 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30.2
 
© 
 
2006 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2006 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
 
408 Mark Boyle
 
Entrepreneurs wishing to set up a business in Ireland can also apply for ‘business
permission permits’ which entitle them to 12-month residency initially, subject to the
new start ups employing two Irish or EEA nationals and the transference of a significant
bond to the state. Meanwhile, the ‘Intra Corporate Concession scheme’ allows
transnational corporations to relocate employees working in their internal labour markets
to Ireland for a period of four years in the first instance.
Whilst outdated, this system has in fact served the high skill needs of the Celtic Tiger
well (McGlaughlan and Salt, 2002) — albeit proving to be oppressive to low-skilled
workers (Valarasan-Toomey, 1998; Allen, 1999). Within this legislative framework,
recruitment agencies, FAS (Ireland’s labour market and training agency) and large
companies themselves have been able to successfully prospect for talent abroad.
Exemplifying the interventionism which characterizes Ireland’s 
 
flexible
developmental state
 
, FAS has recently predicted that bottlenecks in the labour market
will become serious unless immigration policy is given a root and branch overhaul (FAS,
2004) According to FAS, Ireland needs to attract even more highly skilled engineering,
information and communications technology (ICT), health and other professionals and
skilled workers as a matter of urgency if impending bottlenecks in physical, knowledge
and social infrastructures are to be removed. Debate is ongoing as to the forms which
any new regulatory apparatus might assume.
 
Figure 3
 
Demographic changes in Ireland, 1952 to present (source: Central Statistics Office
2005)
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The growing number of foreign workers entering the Irish Republic needs to be
contextualized against the backdrop of O’Riain’s claim that the country exhibits three
distinctive modes of integration into the global economy. Whilst it is beyond the scope
of this article to link specific flows of labour to each of these modes of integration (but
see McPherson and Roche, 1997), some basic pointers can be given (see Table 1).
• Firstly, whilst in the period 1986–91 annual net migration stood at 
 
−
 
26,800, in the
period 1996–2002 annual net migration registered 
 
+
 
25,600. Moreover, from Table 1,
it is evident that between 1991 and 2002, the net addition of over 170,000 foreign-
born residents has brought the total number of foreigners to approximately 400,000,
or 10% of the total population.
• Secondly, in the period 1996–2002, between 40% and 50% of all annual inflows
represented returning Irish nationals who had fled abroad when times were bleaker
in the past. To the extent that returning diasporeans bring with them the added
advantage of a global business acumen, it would be profitable to enquire into the
degree to which they are playing an important role in brokering Ireland’s global
command and control capabilities.
• Thirdly, of the foreign born arrivals since 1991, 44% have come from the UK and
9% from the other EU-15 excluding the UK. This suggests that there is a high skill
regional migration system being established within western Europe but that the
historical ties that bind Ireland to the UK have ensured that the UK has dominated
as a principal source region.
• Fourthly, given the insertion of Ireland into the international divisions of labour
created by US TNCs, it is unsurprising that America continues to dominate the rest
of the world category. Nevertheless, it is clear that flows of skilled labour from
Australia and New Zealand have also grown in importance. Given the general absence
of Antipodean TNCs these migrants have presumably moved at their own behest and
have entered the local labour to be picked up by companies seeking professional,
technical and managerial expertise.
 
Table 1
 
Persons usually resident in the Republic of Ireland and present on census night
classified by place of birth, 1991, 1996, 2002
 
Birthplace Number
1991 1996 2002
 
Total 3,525,719 3,596,543 3,858,495
Republic of Ireland 3,296,994 3,344,919 3,458,479
Outside Ireland 228,725 251,624 400,016
EU 15 190,978 209,880 281,316
EU (excluding UK) 17,127 19,232 32,801
England and Wales 126,487 139,330 182,624
Northern Ireland 35,986 39,567 49,928
Scotland 11,378 11,751 15,963
Rest of world 37,747 41,744 118,700
America (including South) N/A 19,913 29,119
Antipodes N/A 3,636 8,363
Other European N/A 3,605 26,235
Asia N/A 8,150 28,132
Africa N/A 4,867 26,515
 
Source:
 
Central Statistics Office (2005)
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• Finally, recent arrivals have been biased in favour of non-conventional source regions
resulting in a far broader mix of foreign-born workers. The fastest rates of growth
have been recorded amongst inflows from central Europe, Asia and Africa. It is likely
that it has been these migrants that have serviced the less glamorous but equally
important dirty, dangerous and low-paid occupations.
 
An introduction to the creative class thesis
 
Richard Florida’s work demands attention. On the back of the publication of his best
seller 
 
The Rise of the Creative Class
 
 in 2002, the high volume of traffic which has visited
his glossy website, a series of high-profile promotional speaking tours in North America,
Australia and Europe, and the growing influence of his Pittsburgh- (now Washington-)
based consultancy company 
 
Catalytix
 
, Florida has emerged as something of a celebrity
figure within the North American practitioner community and a near messiah for some
city mayors and governors.
Amidst the flotsam of policy debates, populist newspaper articles, and the chatter
which has been fuelled by self-promoting Florida-style websites, it is important to
realize nevertheless that Florida is as much a public intellectual as he is a theoretician
of urban and regional growth and that 
 
The Rise of the Creative Class
 
 is in the end quite
a lightweight academic work. Indeed for some, Florida is intriguing not so much for his
thesis but for the insights he furnishes into how academic ideas come to be produced,
circulated, popularized and policed in the increasingly congested traffic lanes powered
by the global academic industry (Gibson and Klocker, 2004).
It is important then to assess carefully what the creative class thesis has to offer
literature on Tiger economies. Florida (2002) begins with the bold assertion that the
class structure of capitalist societies is currently undergoing tumultuous change at the
heart of which a new ‘creative class’ is coming to the fore. Whilst the availability of
stocks of technology remains a necessary condition for urban and regional development,
it is increasingly becoming an insufficient determinant. According to Florida, the quality
of human capital in any place, and more particularly the membership base of the
‘creative class’ in that place, is now as important — if not more important — in driving
economic growth. Consequently, luring members of the new class to one’s city or region
is a policy imperative.
The creative class is comprised of a ‘super creative core’, which consists of a new
class of scientist and engineer, university professors, poets, actors, novelists,
entertainers, artists, architects and designers, cultural worthies, think-tank researchers,
analysts and opinion formers, ‘whose economic function is to create new ideas, new
technology, and/or new creative content’ (Florida, 2002: 8). Beyond this core group, the
creative class also includes a wider circle of talent working in knowledge-intensive
industries such as high-tech sectors, who ‘engage in complex problem solving that
involves a great deal of independent judgement and requires high levels of education or
human capital’ (
 
ibid.
 
) Whilst recognizing that ‘there are grey areas and boundary issues’,
Florida asserts that the notion of the creative class ‘has a good deal more precision than
existing, more amorphous definitions of knowledge workers, symbolic analysts, or
professional and technical workers’ (
 
ibid.
 
) and on this basis confidently asserts that
around 38 million or 30% of all employed people in the United States belong to this
class.
Given the central role they play, it is crucial that cities and regions re-engineer
themselves so that they offer the right package of attractions to the creative class. It is
here that Florida regards culture to be at least as important — if not more important —
as economic opportunity and labour market conditions. ‘Cool places’, which transcend
distinctions between the bohemian and the bourgeois ethic, which provide ‘low entry
barriers’, which offer ‘plug and play communities’, and which promote tolerance,
diversity, creativity and ‘boho chic’ will offer the greatest lure in future. The policy
diagnosis, therefore, is for places to transform themselves from stuffy, conservative,
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insular, parochial, bureaucratic and stifling ‘working class enclaves’, ‘boring
postindustrial service centres’ and ‘high technology ‘nerdistans’, into liberal, bohemian,
multicultural and culturally cosmopolitan hubs.
Based upon a number of indices variously titled the ‘creativity index’, the ‘gay index’,
the ‘bohemian index’ and the ‘melting pot index’, and focus group analyses with
members of the creative class, Florida identifies cities like San Francisco, Austin, San
Diego, Boston and Seattle as exemplars of the preferred habitat. In contrast places like
Memphis, Norfolk, Buffalo, New Orleans and Oklahoma City stand as repellents to the
creative class. Correlating creative places with measures of talent (including the ‘talent
index’), and technology (the ‘high-tech’ index, the ‘innovation index’ and so on), Florida
claims to have empirical evidence which establishes that it is those places that score
highest for their openness and diversity which are also proving to be key magnets for
talent and drivers of technological progress.
 
‘Cosmopolitanism’ and skilled international migration to the Celtic Tiger
 
Florida’s evangelical zeal has not been confined to North America and recently his policy
prescriptions would seem to be ‘going global’ with alarming speed. Perhaps most
surprisingly, he has emerged as something of a guru and talisman in a number of north
European nations, regions, and cities in particular. In 
 
Europe in the Creative Age
 
 (Florida
and Tinagli, 2004), and 
 
The Flight of the Creative Class
 
 (Florida, 2005a), Florida argues
that Europe stands on the brink of challenging the United States as the leading draw for
the global creative class. Within Europe, the traditional powers, especially France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, look set to lose out to a cluster of cosmopolitan
hubs in Scandinavian and northern European countries. Sweden, Finland, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium all now serve as better habitats for the creative class
and ought to be the most dynamic economies in the future.
Whilst starting off from a low base, the Republic of Ireland has also grown to become
one of the most significant hot spots for creative talent. Indeed, Ireland’s primate city,
Dublin, is cited by Florida (2002: 300–2) as a world-class example of the validity of his
entire thesis. Intriguingly, however, Florida and Tinagli (2004) also note that, based on
their so-called ‘Euro tolerance index’, the Irish Republic stands as one of the least
cosmopolitan and tolerant nations in Europe. The Euro-tolerance index represents a
composite measure based on attitude surveys (examining racism and xenophobia),
values surveys (examining the degree to which a country reflects modern and secular
values towards God, religion, nationalism, authority, the family, women’s rights, divorce
and abortion), and self-expression surveys (examining attitudes toward self-expression,
quality of life, democracy, science and technology, leisure, the environment, trust,
protest politics, immigrants and gays). To the extent that this index is an effective
measure of tolerance, questions could be raised as to whether the Republic of Ireland
in fact presents a challenge to the creative class thesis.
Whilst it is true that its unique social, political and cultural history in the twentieth
century did render Ireland a nationalistic, conservative and insular country on the
margins of Europe, for at least five reasons it now makes sense, alongside political
economy frameworks, to also enquire into the extent to which skilled migrants move to
Dublin in particular because of its status as a cosmopolitan capital.
• Firstly, as noted above, rising immigration in the past decade has brought returning
‘internationalized’ diasporeans back to Ireland, swollen the number of foreign-born
nationals to a historical all-time high, and diversified the country’s immigrant stock
(Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2003).
• Secondly, there has been considerable debate in Ireland over the extent to which its
rapid integration into the world economy has triggered widespread secularization and
a new outward looking post-colonial national identity (Fagan, 2002; Kirby 
 
et al.
 
,
2002).
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• Thirdly, after a relatively slow start, cultural and tourism policy has vigorously sought
to exploit the nation’s cultural, artistic, and literary heritage and has offered tax breaks
and other incentives to contemporary artists, film makers, media moguls and writers
to promote urban and regional growth (Lennon and Seaton, 1998; Bayliss, 2004a;
2004b).
• Fourthly, successive waves of urban regeneration in Dublin have created a number
of new cosmopolitan quarters, including the recently gentrified Docklands area, the
café and culture scene in the Temple Bar zone, and the restoration of O’Connell Street
as a sweeping boulevard in the European tradition (Bartley and Treadwell-Shine,
2003).
• Finally, Dublin City Development Board’s latest plan for the city — 
 
Dublin: a city
of possibilities (2002–2012)
 
 — has placed cosmopolitanism, cultural mixing,
openness, tolerance and cultural inclusion at the heart of future decisions on land use,
urban design and planning (Millington and Young, 2003).
 
The adventures of Scottish expatriates in Dublin
 
Methodological preface
 
The United Kingdom evidently serves as a key source region for skilled workers
relocating to the Irish Republic and within this flow Scottish expatriates constitute a
significant and rapidly expanding force; the net addition of 4,585 Scots between 1991
and 2002 has allowed this community to grow to almost 16,000 (Figure 3). In seeking
to explore the salience of cosmopolitanism and creativity in the relocation decisions of
skilled employees moving to the Celtic Tiger, a case study of the Scottish expatriate
community currently living and working in Dublin will be presented. In no sense can
this constituency be said to be representative of all skill flows to Ireland but it does serve
to provide an interesting test case for three reasons.
Firstly, after three decades of mediocre economic growth, Scottish economic
policymaking is currently the subject of hot debate (Coyle 
 
et al.
 
, 2005; Devine 
 
et al.
 
,
2005). Moreover, in considering options, politicians, academics, and policymakers and
practitioners have turned towards Ireland for guidance (Alexander, 2003; Krugman,
2003; Bradley, 2005). Secondly, in the light of falling birth rates (Randall, 2002; Joshi
and Wright, 2005) and fears that a number of key economic sectors will be threatened
by skill shortages as a result of retirement (Future Skills Scotland, 2002; Brown and
Danson, 2003), the Scottish Executive has established the procurement of skilled labour
as a crucial economic development priority (Fresh Talent Scotland, 2004). Finally,
reflecting the reach of Florida into European urban and regional policy communities,
there has been much debate in Scottish economic policy circles over the extent to which
Scotland is cosmopolitan enough to attract skilled talent (Harrison and Mason, 2003).
This debate has been fuelled by the unscientific but widely held suspicion that Scotland
is  a  stuffy,  insular,  parochial  and  conservative  cultural  backwater  and  as  such  is  an
unattractive proposition for creative talent (Craig, 2003). It  has led to a number of
high-profile anti-racist and anti-sectarian campaigns (including the 
 
One Scotland,
many cultures
 
 campaign) which promote Scottish cities as ‘cosmopolitan as well as
metropolitan’.
In seeking to probe into the thoughts and feelings of Scots living and working in
Dublin, the first challenge was to identify expatriates who might be prepared to share
their experiences. A variety of methods were used to generate an initial contact list of
76 Scots. Among the more successful were the following: face-to-face contact with
companies based in central Dublin; following through Scottish expatriate databases (for
example, databases held by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland, Talent
Scotland, and Strathclyde University Alumni); sourcing people through friends and
colleagues based in Dublin; contacting human resource departments of large companies
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based in Dublin; approaching heads of departments, secretaries and student bodies in
universities and colleges in Dublin, and recruiting customers on Aer Lingus flights from
Glasgow Airport to Dublin.
Once the initial contact list had been established, the objective then was to include
only those Scots who could be identified as skilled employees. A decision was taken to
include all workers who fell into the Registrar General’s socio-economic categories 1,
2 and 3 (non-manual and manual), taking the initial contact list down to just 53. Clearly
not all skilled workers fall within Florida’s creative class schema. Whilst it is true that
a case might be made that creativity plays a large part in the roles performed by most
of these employees, it is important that the distinction between skilled workers on the
one hand and creative talent on the other is preserved. The purpose of the research was
explicitly to gauge the extent to which the creative class thesis was capable of shedding
light on the locational choices of skilled migrants more generally.
Having filtered the initial contact list, the overall objective of the project then became
to learn more about the experiences of Scottish expatriates living and working in Dublin.
Given the small size of the contact list, and more importantly the fact that the survey
method was judged to be too blunt to probe into migrants’ decision-making processes,
a decision was taken to conduct ten focus groups consisting of five expatriates in each
group. Again, due to the small size of the contact list and the obvious logistical
difficulties of bringing busy people together, no effort was made to structure groups
based upon occupation, age, gender, date of migration and so on. In fact, the mixture
of participants in each of the groups eventually proved to add to the richness of the
discussions.
In the end, ten focus groups were completed, between 6 May and 21 August 2003
(Boyle and Motherwell, 2005). Due to participant recruitment difficulties, only 38
expatriates eventually took part, resulting in an average of 3.8 expatriates per group. An
overview of the participants is provided in Table 2. Among the key features of the cohort
to keep in mind when interpreting the focus group findings are the following:
• Consistent with the age profile of all migrants to Dublin, young adults emerged as
the dominant stream (nearly 90% were between the ages of 18 and 35).
• The majority of the participants were not in committed relationships and were
relatively footloose in regards to personal ties (nearly three-quarters were
single).
• Three-quarters of participants were men. Given that it is known that in-migration to
Dublin in the past decade has involved an equal proportion of men and women, this
suggests that either the Scottish influx is unrepresentative, or more likely that males
were more inclined to respond to the focus group invite.
• The vast majority of participants had migrated to Dublin very recently, with nearly
90% arriving from 1998 onwards.
• Less than a quarter of migrants had bought property in Dublin, highlighting both the
transience of the migration and the cost of housing in Dublin.
• Participants hailed from a wide range of geographical origins in Scotland and the
West of Scotland was not the only source of migrants.
• Perhaps surprisingly, only a minority had Irish ancestry, indicating that this is not a
phenomenon driven primarily by historical family connections with Ireland or
diasporic nostalgia.
• Finally, although participants span a wide range of occupational and salary scales,
nearly two-thirds came from the accountancy and finance, ICT, and hotel and catering
sectors.
Given that only 38 of the estimated 16,000 Scots who are based in the Irish Republic
participated in the research, no claims can be made as to the representativeness of the
results reported herein to even this small expatriate community. As is the case with most
qualitative research, the objective of the project has been principally to gain insights
into the perceptions and attitudes of Scottish expatriates, those softer aspects of
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Table 2
 
Summary breakdown of the focus group participants*
 
Question % Question %
 
1. Age 7. Occupation
 
18–25 29 Managers or senior professionals 13
26–35 61 Middle managers, professional or highly skilled 37
36–45 8 Associate professional or skilled manual 32
46–55 3
 
8. Sector
2. Gender
 
ICT 30
Men 74 Accountancy and finance 18
Women 26 Hotel and catering 18
 
3. Origins in Scotland
 
Construction 5
Lanarkshire & West Lothian 29 Utilities (telecommunications) 8
Ayrshire 16 Engineering 5
Glasgow 16 Health/welfare 8
Edinburgh 13 Retailing 8
Borders 8
 
9. Date of migration to Dublin 
 
Fife 8 2003 5
Inverness 5 2002 13
Dumfries & Galloway 5 2001 26
 
4. Irish roots in the family
 
2000 32
Yes 55 1999 5
No 45 1998 8
Yes, first generation 6 Pre 1998 11
Yes, second generation 41
 
10. Length of time in present job
 
Yes, third generation 35 Under 1 year 13
Yes, fourth generation 20 1–3 years 72
 
5. Marital status
 
3–5 years 16
Single 79
 
11. No. of jobs since migration
 
Married 18 One job 48
Divorced 3 Two jobs 23
 
6. Salary (Euro)
 
Three jobs 6
15–25,000 18 Four jobs 18
25–30,000 26 Five or more jobs 5
30–35,000 16
 
12. Tenure
 
35–40,000 5 Rent 73
40–45,000 8 Owner/occupier 23
45–55,000 13 Other 4
55–70,000 6
70,000
 
+
 
8
 
*The total number of participants was 38 and percentages are rounded up.
 
Source:
 
Author’s survey
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migrants’ decision-making processes that are simply not accessible to survey methods.
This qualification noted, the analysis which follows has attempted to include only those
themes that surfaced persistently in groups and which would appear to have a more
general significance. I would therefore want to argue that the conclusions reached are
not unique to only the 38 individuals who took part.
 
The adventures of Scottish expatriates in Dublin
 
Used to his otherwise slick turns of phrase, the reader cannot help but be alarmed at the
long subtitle accompanying Florida’s 
 
The Rise of the Creative Class ‘and how it’s
Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life’
 
 (Florida, 2002). In
choosing a rather cumbersome subtitle, Florida is clearly keen to emphasize the ways
in which members of the creative class are currently transforming work, lifestyle and
everyday routines, and community life. Alert to the significance of these distinctions,
the following analysis will be structured around Florida’s claim that cosmopolitan places
attract creative talent on the basis of the alternative attitudes to work they promote, their
tolerance towards new lifestyles and promotion of innovative everyday routines, and the
porosity of their community structures.
 
Workplaces that offer the freedom to breathe and to become
 
According to Florida, the creative class are at their best in the ‘no collar workplace’,
where hierarchical and bureaucratic company structures and regimes of surveillance
are replaced with new forms of ‘soft control’ which include self-management, peer
recognition and pressure, and intrinsic motivation. The creative class both contribute
to and benefit from revolutionary changes in the workplace, which seek to replace
fossilized Fordist and Taylorist ways of working with flexible and stimulating working
practices. To what extent have Scottish expatriates found working life in Dublin to be
comparatively more liberating than that on offer in Scotland and how significant have
workplace cultures been in their relocation decisions?
An interesting initial finding was that only one participant had been channelled into
Dublin via the internal labour market of a TNC, in this case a TNC operating in the
hotel and catering sector. The overwhelming majority had made their way to Dublin
independently. When asked why they relocated to Dublin, by far and away the most
pervasive explanation advanced was the city’s outstanding career opportunities.
Advocates of this viewpoint most often began by noting that Dublin offered a ‘way out’
for Scots suffering the ignominy of struggling to find careers and salaries appropriate
to their education and skill levels back in Scotland. Many bemoaned the extent to which
graduates were confined to working in ‘call sector factories’ for want of more
appropriate employment. The lack of career opportunities in Scotland was leading to a
frustration that was making migration inevitable:
 
I think the main reason I came over was because there was no work at home. People were
getting degrees and honours degrees but still couldn’t get any work. There is no point in
studying hard in Scotland and working hard in Scotland and by the time you finish your
education you are struggling to get a job, and when you do get a job you’re not really getting
enough to live on, or you are just scraping by so that its not really worth putting yourself
through all the hard work to stay in a place and not benefit from it.
 
Time and again, participants would then point to their disbelief with the ease with which
they could pick up work in Dublin. This disbelief was extended to include not only the
ubiquity of employment 
 
per se
 
, but the comparative superiority of careers and salaries
available in the city. The possibility of working for large multinational companies with
no presence in Scotland, the potential to undertake higher-level functions, the enhanced
possibility of accelerated promotion and the capacity to assume unprecedented
responsibility for one’s age, were all definitive themes:
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It’s just easier to get into better roles and to move up the ladder. You would like to think that
if you moved back to Scotland you would slot into the same place but I very much doubt that
and I think even getting really good experience here you would still be knocked down a peg
or two back in Scotland because the opportunities are not the same.
 
To some extent, Ireland’s successful recruitment of Scottish talent can be attributed to
the aggression and innovation of its army of producer services. For many participants,
the decision to move to Dublin was mediated by Irish-based recruitment agencies,
executive selection firms, executive search companies, FAS recruitment exhibitions, and
by the human resources departments of major employers:
 
I came out of university and had a few job interviews in England, IBM and stuff like that. I
went to Birmingham and it was like a cattle market, roughly three hundred people go and it
was just a nightmare. I sent one e-mail to Bond Recruitment in Dublin, within half an hour
the guy got back to me and said he worked for a large IT company in Dublin. I said, you
cannot have read my CV, it’s only been half an hour. Within 2 weeks he got me an interview.
It was chalk and cheese. I had been looking for about three or four months for a job. The
recruitment companies here are totally different from the ones in Scotland. The ones in
Scotland you go in and you give them your CV and they just say thanks. And you know its
going straight in the bin once you are out the door. Here it was lock the door, this guy has got
experience in IT, they were so desperate for anybody. It was a real culture shock, to come over
here and actually the ball was on your side of the court. Instead of chasing jobs, jobs were
chasing you.
 
These firms have also been proactive in placing adverts in the Scottish press, organising
trade fairs in Glasgow and Edinburgh, soliciting records of employees working in
Scottish companies, and harnessing the Internet in innovative ways to recruit Scottish
talent. Indeed, they would appear to be so aggressive that they had managed to dislodge
one participant from a settled life back in Scotland who had no intention of migrating
to Dublin prior to being lobbied:
 
Actually I didn’t want a job over here. I was quite happy working away in Glasgow. Then I
got a phone call from an agency one day asking if I had heard of the company. And apparently
they were quite well known, they had knocked Scottish and Newcastle out of the FTSE 100
and all that sort of stuff. I said I don’t fancy it but I went across for a free weekend. They
offered me the job and I was saying what am I doing, why am I leaving my friends and family.
I didn’t want it but they had offered eight people it before. They couldn’t get somebody.
 
Scottish expatriates are choosing to migrate to the Celtic Tiger then, primarily
because of the superior salary scales and career opportunities on offer and they are being
made aware of these opportunities and encouraged to relocate by proactive Irish
recruitment practices. This is not to say, however, that Florida’s assertions about
workplace culture are not important. A fascinating result to derive from the focus groups
was the widespread comparisons that were drawn between working life in Scotland and
working life in Dublin. Indeed, this point was raised in all ten focus groups and was the
most discussed issue in the majority of the groups. Although not responsible for their
initial decisions to move, as they settled into Dublin many participants have become
acutely conscious of the city’s more liberated employment regimes.
For at least this small survey cohort, the results would seem to confirm the suspicion
that Scottish workplaces are failing to cultivate conditions that are maximizing the
creative potential of their employees. Scottish businesses were characterized as being
hierarchical, bureaucratic, unfriendly, rigid with time keeping and routes to promotion,
conservative and stifling. For many people, this atmosphere was experienced as de-
motivating, unprofessional, and suffocating. In comparison, Irish-based businesses were
universally acclaimed for being more relaxed, friendly, less intimidating, more
professional, more trusting of their employees, more flexible, and in general more
supportive of the flourishing of the creativity of the employee:
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What is really obvious is the difference in attitude to work. I find that Scottish people tend to
problematize everything. It’s a real negative trait that we go around making problems that
don’t exist. I really noticed that when I worked here for a year and then went back briefly to
Scotland. Even meeting politicians or project leaders, and various people from the community
is different. Here everyone is on first name terms. And you can have lots of informal chats
about issues and you know you are getting into someone’s ear. In Scotland, I found the
structure and the bureaucratic hoops that you have to go through stifling.
When I worked for a law firm in Edinburgh, I always felt that somebody was watching you
leave and you leaving the desk for ten minutes was punishable by death, being thrown out of
the window! I’ve certainly benefited from being a lot more open in working here, and therefore
it’s kind of produced a little more creativity in my working environment because I feel it’s
going to be rewarded. You know they say if you have any ideas, if you feel you can change
things, please tell us. And it’s actually taken up upon, not stolen or you are not told you are
too far down the ladder to do anything or suggest that. Rather it is embraced and taken up
upon and it just makes your whole work worthwhile.
 
Unfortunately, groups did not explore whether the unique cultural ambience of the
Dublin workplace was a function of working regimes introduced by North American
transnational companies or simply reflected a disposition within Irish management
circles to supervise staff in this way. Whatever the source, among the key features of
working life in Dublin that appealed to participants were the following:
• Flexible working hours
• Greater trust over timekeeping during the day
• A greater feeling that one’s ideas are being listened to
• A greater confidence that one is getting recognized for one’s ideas and that these
ideas are not being appropriated by higher-level management
• A blurring of the boundaries between social and work relationships both within and
between different levels of management
• An irreverence for petty red tape
• A more relaxed attitude to work attire
• Promotion based upon talent and not time served
• Greater emphasis upon more lateral approaches to problem solving
• The fostering of a more ‘human’ and ‘fun’, as opposed to ‘mechanical’ and ‘efficient’,
office ambience
• An architectural design of the work place that is less hierarchical and more geared
to team building.
For many participants, the result of Irish working practices was a more playful,
innovative, satisfied and motivated workforce. It would be misleading, however, to fail
to report the voice of a minority of Scots who were finding it difficult to square their
outlook on work with that of the Irish. Whilst most participants argued that freedom
brought with it a sense of responsibility and greater efficiency and productivity, some
saw in the Irish only a lax attitude that was breeding laziness and inefficiency, and which
was providing a frustrating climate in which to work and in which to achieve results in
a certain time frame:
 
For me it is more laid back, but there are two sides to it. To contrast it with the UK, there is
a lack of stupid rules and look as if you’re busy when you’re not — the nonsense like that.
They lack the kind of bosses who have been there for 30 years and you know have to justify
their existence. At times though, it is frustrating as you want to get things done. I find the
attitude is that if something can be left till tomorrow to get done it will be left until tomorrow.
There doesn’t seem to be any sense of urgency to get things done. When you are doing your
work then its great but when the bus driver doesn’t turn up because they can’t be bothered,
that is the flip side.
 
Interestingly, many Scots felt that the balance they brought to the table — a mixture of
Scottish application and Irish flexibility — was the key to the success they were
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experiencing in Dublin. The optimum for one participant in particular, was to ‘hybridize
the Scottish Protestant work ethic with Irish Catholicism’s flair for the creative’.
Everyday life and the lifestyle and lifecourse ‘morph’
According to Florida, the creative class aspire to active and busy lifestyles that facilitate
the consumption of new experiences and the ‘deepening of the moment’. Concomitant
with these new lifestyles, the creative class seeks to ‘morph’ orthodox conceptions of
the life course and extend leisure habits which have previously been associated with the
‘twenty somethings’ across the lifespan. Cities which are open to alternative ways of
living out the lifecourse, and which provide the soft infrastructure which underpins
sensory and experimental consumption practices, will be preferred by members of the
creative class. In what sense can Dublin be said to be a pioneer of the lifestyle and
lifecourse morph?
Although comprising only a small minority of participants, what might be referred
to as ‘tumbleweeds’ come closest to fulfilling Florida’s assertion that Dublin is just such
a city. Tumbleweeds represent migrants who would appear to be very footloose and open
to being ‘blown about’ by factors only partially shaped by career ambitions. Three
particular types of tumbleweed were most conspicuous in the focus groups. First, at the
lower end of the labour market, tumbleweeds were workers in the service sector (for
instance, in hotel and catering trades) who had simply grown bored with life in Scotland
and who had heard about the ‘buzz’ and ‘vibe’ of Dublin and had casually decided to
give it a go:
I’d been here for a weekend and enjoyed it. So I just came over, booked myself into a B&B
on Grafton Street and walked up and down O’Connell Street and Grafton Steet trying to get
work in pubs and I got started in a job straight away. I done it pretty quickly. It was just one
Thursday morning and I was in bed and I thought, I’m getting out of here. I packed in my job
on the Friday and I was over here on the Tuesday. You know it just clicked, I don’t like it here
any more and I need to get away.
Second, further up the scale were recent graduates who wanted to ‘live a little’ before
settling down into a life of responsibility and who thought of Dublin as the perfect party
city to exorcise their adolescent rites of passage:
Dublin seemed to have a real buzz about it you know. I had been over before for a couple of
weekends and had a really cracking time. As a place to drink it is fantastic. It’s a great place
to go out and meet people — people from all over the world — and have some real fun. I had
been to Dublin a couple of times before and it was a party city. The Irish are really friendly
you know, much more open and willing to talk to anyone, especially the Scots, I think because
we have the same sort of humour you know. Even at work you know we are always going out,
not just at the weekends but during the week too. It is part of life here. Drinking and having
a good time.
Finally, and invariably offering skills at the higher end of the labour market, were the
seasoned travellers who had perhaps already tasted travel around the world and for
whom Dublin was on the world map as an exciting place to work for a few years:
I just fancied a change. I had heard a lot about Dublin and I had been in Australia travelling
and decided to try Dublin. I had met a couple of Irish folk in Australia and it sounded really
good.
For these tumbleweeds, Dublin was indeed a perfect incubator of the lifestyle and life
course morph:
Dublin is a very cosmopolitan city. It has a very young population with a lot of disposable
income. Most people I know in Scotland in the 20 to 30 age group are married with a house
and kids and a brand new car. Whereas here, at 30 years old, people are still not interested in
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that kind of lifestyle. The lifestyle revolves around the social life and going out. The bulk of
people’s money is spent on drink, buying clothes and going out to restaurants.
Intriguingly, however, for the majority of participants, more traditional everyday
pressures and life course concerns were impinging themselves forcibly. Whilst Dublin
might be a conducive environment for now, it was not a place where one could envisage
building a long-term future. Towards the end of each of the focus groups, participants
were asked to reflect upon their future locational aspirations and whether they viewed
Dublin as a possible permanent place of abode. There was a definite sense that Dublin
was not the last stop. When asked about the factors that made Dublin unattractive as a
permanent residence it became clear more orthodox everyday worries and life course
demands were overwhelming the frivolities of the city’s attractiveness as a ‘plug and
play’ community:
For me, I really enjoy the social life here and the music scene so I think I have a different
attitude in some respects. If I was wanting to settle down here then I think I would really
question what sort of life I could afford to have. Dublin is a vibrant city but it is getting more
and more expensive to live in and the salaries are not increasing to reflect that. I think my
friends see it as one long weekend and are attracted by the social life here. The reality is a bit
different. And I think after 1 or 2 years the novelty would wear off and you would start to get
itchy feet. But it depends upon what stage in life you are at. I think it’s mainly a great place
for students to come over and experience.
As they reflected upon the ability of the city to function as a place in which to settle
and build a new life, two traditional life course pressures in particular came to the fore:
the quality of life ‘costs’ of living in the city, and the absence of family and friends.
The quality of life costs of residing in Dublin emerged as a major source of frustration
for expatriates. At one level, these costs simply referred to the escalating costs of
living. Referring to ‘rip off Dublin’, one participant observed: ‘My friends at home,
they made a brilliant point, maybe by saying two or three years ago — oh Dublin is
brilliant. Now they are saying, oh Dublin is really expensive. I have a friend at work
who is on her fourth car loan and she doesn’t even have a car. You are simply
borrowing to live’.
Among the most expensive items mentioned were buying and renting property and
car insurance and road tax:
Its really hard to settle down because of the house prices. The cost of living is huge. When
you go back home you notice everything is cheaper. I mean I love it here and I’d really like
to stay but I cannot get a foothold in the housing market. If I was earning the same wage in
Scotland I could have bought a flat 4 years ago in Glasgow or Edinburgh. Then at least you
could start settling down and have a better quality of life but here you know, you can only see
6 months ahead. There is no way I am going to pay 320 K for a house that might only be
worth 80 K. If there were cheaper houses I would have settled here quite happily. My mate
bought a property for 300 K — if he had bought that in Spain it would have been a mansion.
I ain’t paying 300 K for a shed.
The general cost of living here is very high. You know car insurance back home costs between
£200 and £400 a month. It is around £1500 here. Road tax in the UK is about £250 but here
you can easily pay up to £1000. A comparison can also be made with the west end of
Glasgow. You could share a flat up there for around £275 a month. Here you would probably
pay up to £400 for the same flat. I don’t think salaries are keeping up with the heavy cost of
living. In my hotel, two middle managers even living together would find it very difficult to
buy a house. It could take up to two hours to travel to work from an area outside Dublin they
could afford.
In addition to the absolute cost of living, Dublin also scored badly on other more indirect
quality of life costs. Among the many sources of complaint that were repeatedly brought
up in the focus groups were the cost of health care and traffic congestion:
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The NHS in the UK has a bad reputation but it is a beacon of light compared to what you can
expect here. To go and see a GP will cost you 40–50 Euro. And if you get a prescription saying
you need medicine that costs 100 Euros a week, you need to pay that or you will not get the
medicine.
It costs 40 Euros just to visit the doctors. And you don’t want to take the risk with your children
so you have to pay it. I think you can get some free prescriptions but there is a cut-off point
— I think if you spend more than 80 Euro it is free after that. So from a family point of view,
it can be very expensive.
The traffic is the worst thing. That is the one thing that really spoils my quality of life here.
If I mis-time the rush hour traffic it sometimes takes me one hour forty five minutes to get
home. The whole infrastructure is abysmal. Back home you have the Scotrail Network between
Glasgow and Edinburgh, and the M9 and M8. Dublin doesn’t even have a rail network, and
you know the M50 isn’t even finished yet. There is a toll bridge right in the middle of it which
also jams things right up. This LUAS [a light railway] tramway thing they are building, its
basically not going to do half of the things its supposed to do. The transport situation in
Scotland is so much better than here.
The importance of non-substitutable family relationships and friendships represents
another facet of Dublin’s quality of life that was thought to be important in influencing
future location decisions. Many of the participants noted that whilst they were not
homesick, they did get people sick. This was most manifest when people were feeling
vulnerable in Dublin (especially through illness), when people reflected on the mortality
of their parents, and when they considered the importance of kin relations and education
in the upbringing of their children. The emotional attachment to family and friends back
in Scotland represents a major constraint on the mobility of at least some migrants:
One of the girls in our hotel is Irish and she went to work over in Edinburgh for a year and
said it is just like being at home without your friends and your family. That probably describes
my situation here. I simply don’t have the same friends and family here. I think home will
always be your home and it will always be like that.
Cosmopolitanism and borderless communities
According to Florida, the creative class thrives best in communities which are low in
traditional forms of ‘suffocating’ social capital but high in forms of social capital which
support easy entry, intense but shallow relationships, and acceptance of difference and
individuality. Cities housing communities with porous borders are liable to be more
attractive to members of the creative class than ones where strong communities render
outsiders visible and subject to suspicion, judgment, inspection and surveillance. To
what extent is Dublin such a cosmopolitan oasis?
A key feature of the Scottish diaspora in Dublin is the complete lack of a coherent
and well organized expatriate community. The Scots have dissolved into Dublin and
beyond, meeting socially for Scotland versus Ireland rugby games, football matches
broadcast on satellite TV involving the ‘old firm’, or St Andrew’s festivities and
Burns nights, few see it as important that they mix and remain in contact with fellow
Scots.1
Of course, diasporic communities most often tend to form in hostile environments as
a psychological buffer assisting settlement. That a strong community does not exist lends
support to the suggestion that Scottish people are finding Dublin a hospitable and
cosmopolitan home.
1 The phrase the ‘old firm’ refers to football matches which take place between Scotland’s two most
popular football teams, Glasgow Celtic and Glasgow Rangers. St Andrew is the patron Saint of
Scotland. Burns night is held once a year in Scotland to commemorate the famous poet Rabbie Burns.
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The fact that Dublin plays host to nationalities from all over the world does stand as
a definite attraction to Scottish expatriates. Dublin is perceived to be a cosmopolitan
vortex and a party city, full of colour and an exciting place to be. Experiencing other
nations’ ways of life, including their language, religions, customs and festivities, food,
dress sense and folklore, was recognized to be a stimulant:
Dublin is one of the youngest cities in Europe and it also has a really cosmopolitan make up.
Not only are there Europeans but there are Australians, East Europeans and so on. It’s just so
different to Kilmarnock and even Glasgow. There seems to be more excitement about Dublin
because of its make up.
Moreover, Dublin would appear to offer the kind of manicured cosmopolitanism which
Florida contends fosters precisely those intense but shallow relationships which are
important to creative talent. Other cultures are sampled, not fundamentally engaged
with. This sampling mainly takes the form of ‘partying’ with others. Cosmopolitanism
is invariably interpreted in this context as a codeword for the vibrancy and demographic
make up of the night-time leisure economy:
Dublin is so cosmopolitan it’s untrue, here they drink every night, like during the week, it
doesn’t matter what night you go out. Whereas back home, you could be the only person in
the pub. It’s a really open city — you go out and you might never bump into an Irish person,
it’s all Australians, Zimbabweans, New Zealanders and so on, and its brilliant bumping into
people from a wide variety of backgrounds; a lot more open than Scotland and people go out
and socialize more. I think it is a kind of condensed version of London, it adds to your whole
feeling of having diversity.
Dublin is a young city. Like, at home, none of the places are that big, Livingston, Edinburgh
and even Glasgow, they’re not that big really. If you went out every weekend with a group of
friends you’d bump into the same people and you’d be in the same pubs and everyone would
know everyone and there would be nothing exciting. I mean here you could go a million places
and they’d be different people every weekend.
Moreover, Scots are selective about who they choose to be cosmopolitan with! Poorer
migrants from Africa, China and Romania, for instance, are recognized as lying outwith
the social circle, whilst Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans,
and to a lesser extent other Europeans, represent core groups for mixing with.
It would be wrong, however, to think that Scottish people engage only with a kind
of cosmopolitan veneer that sits afloat the nitty gritty of the rest of the city. Whilst Dublin
does function as something of a superficial cosmopolitan boutique, it became clear from
the focus groups that Scottish expatriates were feeding off a deeper vein of tolerance
that had its roots in their acceptance into domestic Irish social networks. The Irish, it
seemed, were going out of their way to make Scottish people in particular feel at home.
The Irish hospitality to the Scots was variously attributed to the shared Celtic culture
and political history of the two nations, the long history of migration between Scotland
and Ireland, similar cultural attitudes, senses of humour, interest in language and social
playfulness:
There are the connections between Ireland and Scotland, Celtic connections, so you are
thought of as being one of them. We kind of have a shared culture, a similar sort of history
so you can sort of blend in. I don’t really think there is any such a thing as a Scottish
community in Dublin. Apart from my boss, I haven’t really met anyone else who is Scottish
and all my friends are Irish. I think because the cultures are so similar we blend in.
It’s probably xenophobic but there is certainly a strong link between the Scots and the Irish.
The Scots and the Irish have a little bit of antagonism towards the English and it usually comes
in handy to mark yourself out as Scottish rather than English in case anyone gets confused.
Because of the proximity of Ireland to Scotland and their kind of shared history, it does seem
to be a deeper relationship here.
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I’ve only ever been to one St Andrew’s night and one Burns night and there was never anything
organized. Maybe the Scottish community isn’t so easily defined and you just naturally blend
in and go with the flow. We are refugees here but we have good jobs and are not a threat to
the Irish people. I’ve never had any sort of abuse from anybody coming up and asking me
why I am here and taking jobs from an Irish person. I have known plenty of coloured people
receiving abuse on the streets. I don’t know, I suppose the Irish have lots of experience of
Scottish people. If you asked 99% of them if they knew any Scottish people they would say
yes. Maybe that’s the problem, they do not know the other cultures. I think it’s to do with the
sense of humour too. The Irish and Scots can share a joke, and have a pint together, whereas
an Irish and Nigerian probably cannot.
Arguably then, it is the importance of Dublin’s open and tolerant attitude to the Scots,
rather than the general and somewhat shallow cosmopolitan film, that sits on the surface
of the city, that helps explain why Scots feel so at home. Florida is correct in arguing
that cities that are open to diversity are a source of attraction to creative talent. In Dublin,
however, a more potent source of social inclusion would seem to stem from the openness
of the Irish to Scottish people in particular. In other words, Dublin appeals to the Scots
first and foremost because of its openness to them, rather than its openness to all cultures
more generally.
From dialogue to synthesis: potential contributions of 
the creative class thesis to political economy frameworks
Open season has now been declared on Florida and a number of scholarly critiques are
emerging (for an extensive commentary on these critiques, see Milligan, 2003; Peck,
2005; Florida, 2005b: chapter 9). Critics from the right have reacted negatively to
Florida’s antipathy to traditional suburban and family lifestyles, attempts to link
economic growth with alternative lifestyles, and reliance upon economic strategies
which simply put ‘lipstick on the gorilla’ (Kotkin and Siegal, 2004; Malanga, 2004).
Meanwhile, critics from the Left have attributed the popularity of Florida’s ideas to the
fact that they do little to disrupt neoliberal orthodoxies such as the need for inter-locality
competition, league tables of attractiveness, place marketing, culture-led urban
regeneration, and the inevitability of socio-economic difference (Kratke, 2004; Peck,
2005). Moreover, according to Peck (2005), Florida’s policy programme actually serves
to fortify neoliberal urbanism, by facilitating its capacity to cuddle up to a soft liberal-
looking veneer.
This article endorses the need to approach Florida’s work critically. Instead of
focusing upon its political and ideological foundations, however, it has taken the creative
class thesis at face value and attempted to test its analytical prowess. Whilst reflections
on the genealogy and spectacular diffusion of the thesis are important, there remains a
more pressing need to test out whether it has any truth in actuality. This article has
sought to assess the contributions which the creative class thesis might make to
explanations of the rise of Tiger economies, which have hitherto been dominated by
political economy perspectives. Its specific focus has been upon Florida’s claim that
cosmopolitanism and tolerance now constitute decisive assets in the global war to attract
members of the creative class, who themselves are now vital brokers of urban and
regional success. Using Scottish expatriates working in the Celtic Tiger as a test case,
an effort has been made to gauge the extent to which the creative class thesis can be
extended to account for the locational choices of skilled international migrants who
settle in Tiger states.
A political economy reading might hold that skilled migrants leave Scotland and
move to Dublin principally upon the basis of the uneven development of both economies.
Ireland’s flexible developmental state or developmental network state has delivered
Tigerhood, economic growth has preceded migration, and differential labour market
Scottish expatriates in Dublin and the ‘creative class’ thesis 423
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30.2
© 2006 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2006 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
opportunities have emerged as the key driver. A Floridian reading in contrast might argue
that Dublin’s rise to prominence as a cool, youthful, European, and cosmopolitan
cultural capital has played an equally significant role in drawing in Scottish expatriates,
and that these migrants are just as much a cause as a consequence of the Celtic Tiger
phenomenon. How far does the evidence go in supporting Florida’s more cultural
interpretation?
Using Florida’s distinctions between work, everyday life and the life course, and
community, the analyses presented above points to a mixed bag of results. The vast
majority of Scottish expatriates move to Dublin primarily because of the city’s
outstanding career opportunities, but report a clear preference towards its more liberal
workplace practices once in situ. Meanwhile, a smaller group of ‘tumbleweeds’ do
approach Dublin as an ideal venue in which to ‘morph’ conventional lifestyle and
lifecourse routines, but for the majority of participants everyday concerns and traditional
life course pressures continue to impinge themselves to the extent that many do not see
a long-term future in the city. Finally, Dublin does serve as a cosmopolitan vortex within
which intense but shallow communities thrive, but shared historical experiences mean
that Dublin is more open to Scots than to other nationalities. Whilst the creative class
thesis does reveal crucial facets of the diasporic experience which would otherwise be
overlooked, it contributes only a partial explanation of Scottish migration to Dublin.
In continuing to deploy oppositional thinking — culture versus economy — this
article risks incurring the wrath of recent critics who claim that progress will only be
made if the ontological unity of both categories is fully appreciated (Gregson et al.,
2001). If the culture/economy schism is to be truly transcended and Florida’s work is
to do more than simply inform and enrich political economy readings of the rise of Tiger
economies, then there will be a need to better understand the fact that the creativity
exercised by talented people is as much a cultural practice as it is an economic and
political one. There exists a dialectical relationship between the creativity of people in
all walks of their lives, and their deployment of this creativity in the labour market and
in the art of statecraft. Creativity, as a social and cultural resource, both constitutes and
is constituted by the technological dynamism of the Irish economy and the flexibility
of the Irish developmental state.
Using this kind of thinking, it will then be possible to introduce questions which thus
far have been rarely even asked. Who, other than members of the creative class, would
have the ingenuity and dexterity to rework the bureaucratic developmental states of
Pacific Asia into the flexible developmental states which are now fermenting? To what
extent do the value systems supported by the creative class now permeate the practices
of the flexible developmental state? Are flexible developmental states run by members
of the creative class? Can one detect the handicraft of creative talent in the architectures
and  practices  of  the  flexible  developmental  state?  Are  these  states  functioning  in
the interests of creative talent to the detriment of other social groups? And, most
fundamentally of all, what kinds of places are secreted out of the interactions between
creative talent, technologically innovative economies, and flexible developmental states?
Mark Boyle (mark.boyle@strath.ac.uk), Department of Geography and Sociology, 50 
Richmond St, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G1 1XN, UK.
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Résumé
L’article évalue en quoi la thèse décisive de Richard Florida sur la ‘classe créative’
pourrait contribuer aux tentatives actuelles de ré-intégrer la ‘culture’ dans les
explications économico-politiques de la montée des économies du Tigre. Il réfléchit à
l’intérêt de revenir sur le rôle des migrants qualifiés dans les États du Tigre, ainsi que
sur les facteurs qui les y attirent a priori. A partir d’analyses d’une série de groupes
de discussion impliquant des expatriés écossais qui travaillent à Dublin, l’article
s’efforce en particulier d’apprécier la portée de la thèse de la classe créative pour
justifier les préférences d’implantation des migrants très compétents. Si le travail de
Florida a indubitablement clarifié des facettes de l’existence des expatriés qui, sinon,
ne seraient pas si évidentes, il convient de remettre en cause son aptitude à expliquer
les rapports entre technologie, talent et tolérance chez le Tigre celte. De plus, bien que
l’économie politique et les interprétations de Florida fassent davantage que de se
renseigner mutuellement, il faudra déterminer plus nettement les manières complexes
selon lesquelles des États en développement recoupent des flux de compétences et des
programmes culturels cosmopolites.
